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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence
obtained pursuant to a consent search of a motel room. The detective received
valid consent from a third party to search the motel room. The district court erred
when it held the detective was required to ask for separate consent to search a
pink backpack found in plain view.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Detective Williamson had a warrant to arrest Reymundo Chavez and he
received a tip that Chavez was staying at the El Rancho Motel in Room No. 2.
(Tr., p. 6, Ls. 7 - p. 7, L. 22, p. 51, Ls. 2-8.) Detective Williamson requested
assistance. (Tr., p. 6, L. 25 - p. 7, L. 3.) Detective Cwik, Detective Cantrell, and
Special Agents Jacobson and Beard with the FBI responded to Detective
Williamson's request. (Tr., p. 22, L. 25 - p. 23, L. 9, p. 51, Ls. 2-8, p. 52, Ls. 1418.) When the officers knocked on the door Katherine Gallagher, a.k.a. Kathy
Rodriguez answered. (Tr., p. 7, L. 23 - p. 8, L. 24.)
The motel room was small, approximately 10 feet by 15 feet. (Tr., p. 54,
Ls. 1-5.) The motel room contained a bed, a television and dresser drawers.
(Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-14.) On the bed was a pink backpack and a purse. (Tr., p. 15,
Ls. 17-24, p. 34, Ls. 5-24.) There were two doors on the back wall of the motel
room.

(Tr., p. 10, Ls. 8-14, p. 54, Ls. 1-5.)

The door on the right led to a

bathroom and the door on the left led to a small bedroom. (Id.) The door to the
left was closed. (Id.)
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When Gallagher opened the front door, the officers could also see Dona
Westlake and Scott Nicholas Parker standing in the main room. (Tr., p. 10, L. 20
- p. 11, L. 15.)

Detective Williamson asked Gallagher if Reymondo Chavez,

a.k.a. "Rey-Rey" was in the motel room. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-11, p. 8, L. 25 - p. 9, L.
6.)

Gallagher said he was in the back.

(Id.)

Detective Williamson asked

Gallagher if she was the renter of the motel room and she said she was. (Tr., p.
41, Ls. 17-21.)

Detective Williamson asked Gallagher permission to enter the motel room
and Gallagher consented.

(Tr., p. 9, Ls. 12-22, p. 52, L. 19 - p. 53, L. 5.)

Detective Williamson requested Gallagher, Westlake and Parker exit the motel
room so they could get Chavez out of the back bedroom. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 16-24,
p. 12, Ls. 18-24, p. 42, Ls. 11-18.)
Detective Williamson and Detective Cwik entered the motel room. (Tr., p.
11, L. 22 - p. 12, L. 10, p. 53, L. 21 - p. 55, L. 22.) Detective Williamson opened

the door to the back bedroom and saw Chavez sleeping on the bed. (Tr., p. 11,
L. 22 - p. 12, L. 10.) Detective Williamson woke Chavez up and advised him he
had a warrant for his arrest. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-17.) Detective Williamson placed
Chavez under arrest and handcuffed him. (Id.) While Detective Williamson was
patting Chavez down, a glass pipe fell from Chavez's pants, down his pant leg
and landed at his feet.

(Id.) Chavez was escorted out of the motel room and

placed in a waiting patrol unit to take him to jail. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 6-9.)
During this time, Detective Cwiek observed a glass bong in an open
drawer in a dresser next to the bed in the main room. (Tr., p. 13, L. 10- p. 14, L.
2

8.) Detective Cwiek brought the bong to Detective Williamson's attention. (Id.)
Detective Williamson then called Gallagher back into the room to discuss the
bong. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 9-19.)
Detective Williamson explained that they had seen drug paraphernalia,
and he asked Gallagher for consent to search the room. (Tr., p. 14, L. 17 - p.
15, L. 11.) Gallagher gave consent to search the room.

(Id., p. 29, Ls. 2-9.)

Detective Williamson received blanket consent from Gallagher to search her
motel room:
Q.
Based on your discussion with Ms. Gallagher, did you
understand there to be any limitations placed on the search?

A.

No, I did not.

(Tr., p. 16, Ls. 16-19.) Gallagher did not tell the officers not to search a particular
area. (Tr., p. 79, Ls. 6-8.) Prior to the search, Gallagher did not indicate that any
of the items in the room were not hers. (Tr., p. 79, Ls. 2-13.)
This conversation took place next to the front door to the motel room. (Tr.,
p. 16, Ls. 12-15.) During this time, Westlake was directly outside of the front
door. (Tr., p. 18, L. 17- p. 19, L. 11, p. 31, Ls. 8-16, p. 58, L. 14-p. 61, L. 4.)
The front door was open and Westlake was approximately two to three feet
outside the front door near a bench. (Id.)
After Gallagher granted consent, Detective Cwik began his search of the
room.

(Tr., p. 59, Ls. 6-20.) He noticed the pink backpack on the bed had a

small pill-type bottle attached to it. (Tr., p, 59, L. 18 - p. 60, L. 14.) These pilltype bottles are frequently used to conceal illegal controlled substances.
3

(Id.)

The pink backpack was in plain view on the bed in the main room. (Tr., p. 62, L.
25 - p. 63, L. 3.)

Detective Cwik believed the pink backpack belonged to

Gallagher because Gallagher said it was her room.

(Tr., p. 60, Ls. 7-14.)

Detective Cwik searched the pink backpack and the pill-type bottle container.
(Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-24.) The pill-type bottle contained white crystalline substance
and pills. (Id.)
Detective Williamson asked Gallagher if she owned the pink backpack.
(Tr., p. 16, L. 20 - p. 17, L. 1.) Gallagher denied owning the backpack and said it
may belong to Westlake.

(Id.)

Detective Williamson then read Westlake her

Miranda rights. (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 2-24.) Westlake waived her Miranda rights. (Id.)
Detective Williamson asked Westlake if it was her backpack and she nodded her
head yes.

(Id.)

He asked her what the white crystalline substance was and

Westlake said she thought it looked like meth. (Id.) The state charged Westlake
with Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine). (R., pp. 38-39.)
Westlake filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that the officers unlawfully
detained her and that Gallagher's consent to search the room did not extend to a
search of the pink backpack. (R., pp. 51-52, 59-70.) At the hearing, Detectives
Williamson and Cwik and Debra Bowler, the owner and manager of the El
Rancho Motel, testified. (R., pp. 83-94.) Ms. Bowler testified Room No. 2 had
been rented by Katherine Gallagher a.k.a. Kathy Rodriguez and no one else.
(Tr., p. 44, L. 19- p. 45, L. 21.)
Regarding the unlawful detention argument, the district court ruled that the
officers took appropriate steps for officer safety in removing Westlake, Gallagher
4

and Parker from the motel room. (Tr., p. 110, L. 1O - p. 111, L. 11.) The district
court ruled there was a "de facto detention, but it was for perfectly legitimate
purposes during the period of time that - for which it extended." (Id.)
On the issue of whether Gallagher's consent to search the room extended
to the search of pink backpack, the district court looked at both Gallagher's actual
authority and apparent authority. The district court first ruled that Gallagher did
not have actual authority to grant consent to search the pink backpack because it
was not her backpack. (Tr., p. 111, L. 21 -p. 112, L. 6.) The district court held
that Detective Cwik's search of the pink backpack based upon Gallagher's
consent was not unreasonable, but Gallagher did not have actual authority to
consent to the search of individual items in the room:
Now, the - the officers I think somewhat proceeded on the - on the
- on a very understandable assumption that the authority granted
by Gallagher to search the room extended to every item in the
room. I don't - that wasn't really an unreasonable common sense
standpoint. You know, are we going to ask Ms. Gallagher about
every item while we - while we search it?
I can under - there's - I understand that the issue that - why the
officers would proceed to search as if they had - the actual
authority did extend to every item, but it does not. Actual authority
does not extend to every item in a room.
(Tr., p. 112, Ls. 7-19.) The district court next analyzed whether Gallagher had
the apparent authority to consent to Detective Cwik's search of the pink
backpack. (Tr., p. 113, Ls. 19-25.) The district court determined the officers had
a duty to get consent to search each individual item, but the district court
understood why the officers did not ask for consent to search each individual
item. (Tr., p.115, L.19-p.116, L.1.)
5

So I think that's where the duty of reasonable inquiry arises. And I
want to make clear here in this case that I don't think the officers
did the least bit - took any wrong acts of any sort or nature
whatsoever. You have to remember, their focus is on the Chavez. They get in there. Gallagher - they see a safe, they see
stuff, I mean, like pipes in the room and so on, so forth. I mean,
they're obviously focusing on why they're there.
And as testified by Officer Cwik, he said when he searched the pink
backpack, he was assuming he was searching Gallagher Gallagher's pink backpack. Am I supposed to ask every time I
come to an item of hers when she's given me consent to search the
room? And that's very reasonable, and he had consent to search
that backpack if, in fact, it was Gallagher's.
(Tr., p. 116, L. 11 - p. 117, L. 1.) The district court went on explain that the
officers did not do anything wrong:
So it's not - I'm in no way indicating that this is somehow any kind
of behavior by law enforcement that wasn't what you would want
law enforcement to be doing.
(Tr., p. 121, L. 25 - p. 122, L. 3.)

Despite the district court's finding that the

officers did not do anything wrong, the district court granted the motion to
suppress the evidence found in the pink backpack. (Tr., p. 124, Ls. 4-11, R., p.
95.)
So I just - the only issue here is the scope of consent. I believe
they had a reasonable duty of inquiry, and for perfectly
understandable reasons, for which I assign no fault, I don't think the
question that needed to be asked was asked. And therefore, that
duty of reasonable inquiry was not satisfied, and the actual
authority of Ms. Gallagher to grant a - the right to search the entire
room did not extend, on these facts, to the pink backpack.
Although, again, I want to stress I do not fault the officer for
continuing to move forward on his theory he had the actual
authority. From a human standpoint, it was just - nothing wrong
with that.

6

(Tr., p. 123, L 16 - p. 124, L. 3.) The state appealed the district court's order
granting the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 98-101.)

7

ISSUE
Did the district court err by concluding that officers did not have the
apparent authority to search the pink backpack and had to get specific consent to
search to search the pink backpack?
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ARGUMENT
Gallagher Had Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search Of The Pink
Backpack
A.

Introduction
Gallagher gave officers consent to search her motel room. (Tr., p. 14, L.

17 - p. 15, L. 11, p. 29, Ls. 2-9.) A pink backpack was sitting on the bed in plain
view. (Tr., p. 62, L. 25 - p. 63, L. 3.) Detective Cwik searched the pink backpack
and the attached pill-type bottle and found methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1424.) After Detective Cwik found the methamphetamine Gallagher said the pink
backpack belonged to Westlake, and Westlake admitted the pink backpack
belonged to her. (Tr., p. 16, L. 20 - p. 17, L. 24.) The district court suppressed
the methamphetamine because the officer did not specifically ask for consent to
search the pink backpack. (Tr., p. 123, L. 16 - p. 124, L. 11, R., p. 95.) The
district court erred by holding the officers were constitutionally required to ask for
consent to search each separate container in the motel room.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147
Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court defers to the trial court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous; however, the appellate court
freely reviews the determination as to whether constitutional requirements have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345,
9

256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011) (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d
1194, 1197 (2007)).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Determined Gallagher Did Not Have The
Apparent Authority To Consent To The Search Of The Pink Backpack And
Required The Officers To Get Consent For Each Container In The Motel
Room
On appeal, the state does not challenge the district court's factual findings.

The district court repeatedly found the officers acted reasonably. (Tr., p. 112, Ls.
7-19, p.116, L.11-p. 117, L.1, p.123, L. 16-p. 124, L. 3.) However, the
district court held the officers were required to ask for consent to search each
container in the motel room. (Tr., p. 115, L. 19 - p. 117, L. 18, p. 120, Ls. 5-16,
p. 123 L. 5 - p. 124, L. 11.) The district court erred.
Warrantless searches are unconstitutional, unless they are authorized by
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Barker, 136 Idaho
728, 730, 40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716
P.2d 1288 (1986)).

Properly given consent is a recognized exception.

!g.

"When the state seeks to justify a· warrantless search based upon consent, it is
not limited to proof that the consent was given by the defendant." !g. The state
may show that consent came from a third party who "possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to
be inspected." !g. at 730-31, 40 P.3d at 88-89 (citing United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988 (1974)).
"The common authority of the third party does not rest upon the law of
property." Id. The state is not required to show the third party actually had a
10

property interest in the effects searched.

Jg.

"Rather, the common authority

rests upon the joint access or control of the property searched."

Id.

Co-

inhabitants assume the risk that one of them may consent to a search of
common areas and items. Johnson, 110 Idaho at 523, 716 P.2d at 1295. That
consent extends to common areas and items in the common areas over which
the inhabitants share authority. State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 965, 277 P.3d
408,412 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Barker, 136 Idaho at 731, 40 P.3d at 89).
If a person consenting to a search does not have actual authority, but
government agents reasonably believe that the person has authority, a
warrantless search may still be valid. State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 838-839,
186 P.3d 688, 694-695 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
188-89 (1990); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999);
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998)). "The
key to the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement is the concept
of reasonableness."

Brauch, 133 Idaho at 220, 984 P.2d at 708 (citing

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-88; State v. Mccaughey, 127 Idaho 669, 672, 674,
904 P.2d 939, 942, 944 (1995)).

"The police belief must be objectively

reasonable that the person giving consent has the authority to do so." Jg. (citing
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188; Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707). "Law
enforcement officers may not simply 'accept a person's invitation to enter
premises' if the surrounding circumstances are 'such that a reasonable person
would doubt [that person's authority to consent] and not act ... without further
inquiry."' Jg. (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188).
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The police have a duty of

reasonable investigation before they may rely upon the authority of a third party
to consent to a search. lg_. (citing Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707).
However, when there are multiple occupants of a room, and the officers have
received consent from only one of the occupants the officers can search any item
in that room "if they had a reasonable suspicion that [the person granting
consent] owned possessed or controlled the item." Barker, 136 Idaho at 731732, 40 P.3d at 89-90 (citing United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.
1991)).
Based upon the circumstances it was objectively reasonable for Detective
Cwik to rely upon the apparent authority of Gallagher to consent to the search
the pink backpack.

It was reasonable for Detective Cwik to believe that

Gallagher owned, possessed or controlled the pink backpack sitting in plain view
on the bed in the motel room rented by Gallagher. Detective Cwik testified that
he believed the pink backpack belonged to Gallagher. (Tr., p. 78, L. 15 - p. 79,
L. 5.) The district court repeatedly found that Detective Cwik reasonably believed

that Gallagher had the authority to consent to search of items in the room. (Tr.,
p.112, Ls. 7-19, p.116, L.11-p.117, L.1, p.123, L.16-p.124, L. 3.)
Now, the - the officers I think somewhat proceeded on the - on the
- on a very understandable assumption that the authority granted
by Gallagher to search the room extended to every item in the
room. I don't - that wasn't really an unreasonable common sense
standpoint. You know, are we going to ask Ms. Gallagher about
every item while we - while we search it?
(Tr., p. 112, Ls. 7-14.)
And as testified by Officer Cwik, he said when he searched the pink
backpack, he was assuming he was searching Gallagher 12

Gallagher's pink backpack. Am I supposed to ask every time I
come to an item of hers when she's given me consent to search the
room? And that's very reasonable, and he had consent to search
that backpack if, in fact, it was Gallagher's.
(Tr. , p. 116, L. 2 0 - p. 11 7, L. 1.)
The - it's - the question that needed to be asked of Gallagher was
- would be, well, is this your backpack? And as stated, I certainly
understand why that question was never asked.
(Tr., p. 117, Ls. 19-22.)
So it's not - I'm in no way indicating that this is somehow any kind
of behavior by law enforcement that wasn't what you would want
law enforcement to be doing.
(Tr., p. 121, L. 25 - p. 122, L. 3.)
Although, again, I want to stress I do not fault the officer for
continuing to move forward on his theory he had the actual
authority. From a human standpoint, it was just - nothing wrong
with that.
(Tr., p. 123, L. 24 - p. 124, L. 3.) Despite these specific findings of reasonable
belief the pink backpack was within the scope of the consent, the district court
ruled that Detective Cwik was required to inquire about the ownership of the pink
backpack he found on the bed before he searched it. (Tr., p. 123, L. 16 - p. 124,

L. 11.) This ruling is contrary to how the Idaho courts have applied the doctrine
of apparent authority and the duty of reasonable inquiry.
In Barker, Tate was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, but
was out on parole. Barker, 136 Idaho at 729, 40 P.3d at 87. As a condition of
his parole Tate waived his Fourth Amendment rights. !Q_. Tate absconded from
supervision and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

!Q_.

The parole officer

learned that Tate had been staying in an apartment leased by Barker. !Q_. at
13

729-730, 40 P.3d at 87-88.

The parole officer found Tate outside Barker's

apartment. J.Q. at 730, 40 P.3d at 88. Tate said he had been staying with Barker
for the last couple of weeks. J.Q. The parole officer arrested Tate. J.Q. The parole
officer and some narcotics officers went to the apartment and contacted Barker.

J.Q. Barker said that Tate did not live at her apartment. J.Q. Despite her denials,
the parole officer and the narcotics officers then searched Barker's apartment
based upon Tate's Fourth Amendment waiver. J.Q. One of the narcotics officers
searched the master bedroom.

J.Q.

On a counter in the master bedroom he

found a black (or dark colored) fanny pack. Id. A drug dog alerted on the fanny
pack. J.Q. The officer asked Barker who owned the fanny pack. Id. Barker said
she owned the fanny pack.

J.Q.

The officer opened the fanny pack and

discovered methamphetamine and a vehicle title with both Tate's and Barker's
name. J.Q. Barker was charged with possession of the methamphetamine found
in the fanny pack.

Id.

After being bound over to district court, Barker filed a

motion to suppress. J.Q. The district court found the search of the apartment was
reasonable pursuant to Tate's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights and denied
the motion to suppress. J.Q. Baker plead guilty and reserved the right to appeal.

J.Q. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the search of the fanny pack violated
Barker's Fourth Amendment rights because the state had not shown that Tate
had joint access or control over it. J.Q. The state sought review. J.Q.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Barker argued that Tate's consent to
search the apartment could not extend to the fanny pack in particular because
the officer knew before the search that the fanny pack belonged to Barker, and
14

not Tate. lg. at 731, 40 P.3d at 89. The Supreme Court disagreed and held the
officers could search any item in the bedroom if they had reasonable suspicion
that Tate owned, possessed or controlled the item. lg. at 731-732, 40 P.3d at 8990 (citation omitted). When searching a residence pursuant to the consent of
only one of the occupants, the officers are not required in all instances to inquire
into the ownership of item when the ownership is not obviously and undeniably
apparent. lg.
When searching a residence pursuant to the consent of only one of
the occupants, the officers are not required in all instances to
inquire into the ownership, possession, or control of an item when
ownership, possession, or control is not obviously and undeniably
apparent. If the officers do inquire, they are not necessarily bound
by the answer given. The test is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the
item was owned, possessed, or controlled by the occupant who
consented to the search.
lg. (citing Davis, 932 F.2d 752).

Even though Barker said that she owned the

fanny pack, which meant that Tate's consent would not extend to the fanny
pack-the Idaho Supreme Court held that under the totality of the circumstances
the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Tate had common authority
over the fanny pack. lg. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the fanny
pack was located in the bedroom which was jointly occupied by Tate and Barker,
and it was sitting on a counter near the adjoining bathroom where it was
reasonably available. lg. "There was nothing about its location or appearance
that would indicate that it was owned, possessed, and controlled exclusively by
Barker." lg. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed and held the officers reasonably

15

believed they had the apparent authority to search the fanny pack. Id. at 731732, 40 P.3d at 89-90.
The same should apply to the pink backpack found in plain view on the
bed. Not only was the pink backpack in plain view on the bed, it was on the bed
with Gallagher's purse. (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 5-23, p. 69, Ls. 5-18, p. 70, L. 22 - p. 71,
L. 2.) There was nothing about the location or appearance of the pink backpack

that would indicate that it was owned, possessed and controlled exclusively by
Westlake. Under the totality of the circumstances Officer Cwik had a reasonable
suspicion that Gallagher owned, possessed or controlled the pink backpack.
There was also no evidence that Westlake objected to the search of the
motel room or the pink backpack.

An active objection is important to the

reasonableness of the officer's belief in the apparent authority.

See State v.

Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 159, 983 P.2d 225, 232 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Frizzel,
132 Idaho 522, 975 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1999). An officer may not be able to rely
upon a third party's apparent authority to a search when another party with a
superior possessory interest in the property is present and objects or denies
consent. Benson, 133 Idaho at 159, 983 P.2d at 232. "When an individual who
has a possessory interest in an item remains silent while a third party with
apparent authority gives consent to search an item, it is objectively reasonable
for a police officer to conclude that he 'had all the consent that was
constitutionally required."'

lQ. (citing Frizzel, 132 Idaho at 525, 975 P.2d at

1190.)

16

In Frizzel, a Boise police officer stopped Jennifer Smith while she was
driving. Frizzel, 132 Idaho at 523, 975 P.2d at 1188. Frizzel was a passenger.
.[Q. The car was owned by a third party not present on the scene. .[Q. The officer

noticed shotgun shells behind Smith and Frizzel and he asked Smith for consent
to search the vehicle. .[Q. Smith gave consent to search the vehicle. .[Q. The
officer found a small blue backpack large enough to hold a weapon.
blue backpack contained marijuana and $1,600.

.[Q.

Id. The

Frizzel then claimed

ownership of the blue backpack and he was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver. .[Q.
evidence.

l.9..

Frizzel moved to suppress the

As part of his motion, Frizzell claimed the search of the car and

the small blue backpack was improper . .[Q. The district court granted the motion
to suppress and the state appealed.

l.9..

The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed and held that Smith had the
apparent authority to consent to the search of small blue backpack. .[Q. at 524525, 975 P.2d at 1189-1190. The Idaho Court of Appeals found that the officer
had a reasonable belief that Smith had the authority to consent to the search of
the car and the blue backpack because there was no indication prior to the
search the backpack belonged to Frizzel and Frizzel did not object when Smith
granted consent to search the entire vehicle. !_g.
In the instant case, the pack was not within Frizzel's possession,
but behind the passenger seat. Thus, there was no indication that
the pack belonged to Frizzel, nor did Frizzel attempt to exercise any
control over it. Moreover, Frizzel sat silently by while Smith gave
general consent to search the truck for any weapons and any
drugs, and said nothing as the officer's search moved from the
driver's side of the pickup to the passenger's side, where the pack
17

was located. There is no evidence in the record that Frizzel
expressed a desire to limit the scope of Smith's consent to search.
Only after being questioned regarding the pack, did Frizzel then
admit to ownership and accurately describe its contents.
Id. at 525, 975 P.2d at 1190.
Much like Frizzel, there was no indication prior to search that the pink
backpack belonged to Westlake.

Nor is there any evidence in the record that

Westlake objected to the search of the apartment or the search of the pink
backpack.

When Gallagher gave her consent to search the entire room,

Gallagher was standing next to the open front door, and Westlake was only two
to three feet away from the front door. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 12-15, p. 18, L. 17 - p. 19,
L. 11, p. 31, Ls. 8-16, p. 58, L. 14 - p. 61, L. 4.) There is no evidence that

Westlake objected to the search. Prior to the search there was no evidence to
suggest that the pink backpack was not Gallagher's.
Under the totality of the circumstances Detective Cwiek had a reasonable
suspicion that the pink backpack was owned, possessed, or controlled Gallagher
and Detective Cwik did not have a duty to inquire further. The district court erred
by requiring Detective Cwik to seek consent to search each separate item in the
motel room.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's
decision to suppress and this case be remanded for further proceedings.
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